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PUBLIC LANDS-The Public Trust Doctrine Includes a
Right to Equality of Access to Municipal Beach Area.
In 1970, the New Jersey municipality of Avon-by-the-Sea adopted an
ordinance which required non-residents using the municipal beach
area to pay a substantially higher fee than residents or taxpayers of
Avon.' The neighboring inland municipality, Neptune City, challenged
the ordinance, asserting that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the fourteenth amendment and denied plaintiffs their common law right
of access to navigable waters and tidelands.2 The New Jersey Superior
Court held that there was a reasonable basis for discriminatory beach
fees since the taxpayers of Avon bore the financial burden of maintaining and policing the beach area. The court, in Neptune City v. Avonby-the-Sea, also refuted the contention that plaintiffs' common law public water rights were abridged since in New Jersey the legislature has an
absolute power to alienate public trust lands or vacate the right in such
lands.' The court, therefore, construed the statute 4 which authorized
the municipality to set beach fees as a delegation of an absolute state
power over trust lands.
1. Only residents or taxpayers could purchase a season pass for $10.
Nonresidents could purchase monthly passes for $10 each month or buy daily badges.
2. "Tidelands", "foreshore" or "greatwater", as hereafter used, refers to the
land between the mean high water mark and the mean low water mark held by the
states as a public trust. LORD HALE, DE JURIS MARIS, republished in S. MOORE, A
HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE

378 (1888).

3. Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 114 N.J. Super. 115, 274 A.2d 860 (1971).
4. N.J.S.A. 40:61-22.20 provides:
The governing body of any municipality bordering on the Atlantic ocean [sic],
tidal water bays or rivers which owns or shall acquire, by any deed of dedication or otherwise, lands bordering on the ocean, tidal water bays or rivers, or
easement rights therein, for a place of resort for public health and recreation and for other public purposes shall have the exclusive control, government and care thereof and of any boardwalk, bathing and recreational facilities, safeguards and equipment, now or hereafter constructed or provided
thereon, and may, by ordinance, make and enforce rules and regulations for
the government and policing of such lands, boardwalk, bathing facilities,
safeguards and equipment; provided that such power of control, government,
care and policing shall not be construed in any manner to exclude or interfere with the operation of any State law or authority with respect to such
lands, property and facilities. Any such municipality may, in order to provide funds to improve, maintain and police the same and to protect the same
from erosion, encroachment and damage by sea or otherwise, and to provide
facilities and safeguards for public bathing and recreation, including the employment of lifeguards, by ordinance, make and enforce rules and regulations
for the government, use, maintenance and policing thereof and provide for
the charging and collecting of reasonable fees for the registration of persons
using said lands and bathing facilities, for access to the beach and bathing
and recreational facilities, but no such fees shall be charged or collected
from children under the age of 12 years.
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On appeal, the supreme court, per Justice Hall, reversed the decision
of the lower court. 5 The court saw no legislative authorization in the
language of the statute for charging higher beach fees. The court
rested its decision upon the common law right of the citizenry to equal
access to public lands: the public trust doctrine. 6 In Avon, the New
Jersey Supreme Court articulated a modern and flexible view of the
public trust doctrine which marks a significant departure from prior
cases and an extension of the trust doctrine generally.
The Avon decision could have a decisive impact in Illinois, as well
as in other jurisdictions with lake or oceanfront recreation areas which
attract large crowds. Several Illinois municipalities which administer
Lake Michigan beaches charge higher fees to non-resident beach users.7
The Avon rationale would afford a persuasive argument in a challenge
to those fee regulations.
THE PUBLIC TRUST:

A

FLEXIBLE DOCTRINE

The development of the public trust doctrine shows the responsiveness of the doctrine to public pressures. A review of the history of
the public trust is important to a consideration of the Avon decision
and possible future applications.
English treatises and American courts have espoused a doctrine that
states hold title to greatwater resources merely as trustees and for
common benefit. This "public trust" doctrine embodies the prevailing perceptions of the citizen/state relation respecting public water
interests. Yet the trustees' powers and the beneficiaries' interests
have been protean and amorphous. s
The public trust doctrine was originally derived from the Roman
law. The shores of the Mediterranean, actually an imperial inland sea,
were common to all citizens. 9 After the disintegration of the Roman
Empire, commercial and fishing activities became strictly local, and the
broad concept of a common right was lost in the struggle of feudal
lords to expand private interests.'
In medieval England, the king had
5.
6.

Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).
Id. at 303, 294 A.2d at 51.

7.

Lakefront municipalities charge higher fees in two ways:

higher beach use

fees for non-residents, or a non-resident parking fee. Evanston and Wilmette charge
non-residents twice as much as residents. In 1972, non-residents paid $16.00 to use

Evanston or Wilmette beaches for the season, residents paid $8.00.

Lake Forest and

North Chicago charge parking fees to non-residents to achieve the same goal, while
residents are permitted to park in beach lots using municipal stickers as identification.
8. Note, State Citizen Rights Respecting Greatwater Resource Allocation: From
Rome to New Jersey, 25 RuTGERS L. REV. 571, 574 (1971). [hereinafter cited as Greatwater Resource].
9. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 36.1 at 184 (Clark ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited

as Clark].
10.

GreatwaterResource, supra note 8, at 575.
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a private interest in all tidal and riverbed soil as well as in the other
lands of his realm. 1' As one writer would suggest, this view reflected
the political and economic structure of feudal society. By the thirteenth
century, with the gradual, though limited, revival of trade and commerce, the public had acquired easements in riverbanks and the foreshore for commercial purposes. 1 2 The king's right to grant and control
tidal and riparian lands was circumscribed to a degree by the Magna
a
Carta.
The tremendous expansion of international trade and commerce
during the Renaissance necessitated unrestricted access to the foreshore
and riverbanks for shipping and fishing. The gradually developing
theory that the Crown held the tidal lands in trust for the people' 4 was
ratified during the Elizabethan era, again by political and economic
pressure. Lawyers argued, successfully after a time, that in disputed
foreshore claims there was to be a presumption that the title was in the
Crown for the benefit of the people.1 5 Thus, private interests were
subordinated to public use to facilitate the expansion of trade and
British naval hegemony. By the Glorious Revolution, the trusteeship
was transferred to Parliament. 6
After the American Revolution, the separate colonies succeeded to
the sovereignty of Parliament. Under the Constitution, the states retained control of their tidelands, subject to the federal government's
paramount control of navigation.' 7 The general view is that states hold
the tidelands subject to a public trust, and, that grantees of the state
8
take title subject to the trust.'
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NEW JERSEY

Against the contemporary background of a growing awareness of
an imminent ecological and human use crisis of water resources, the
11.

Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Traditional

Doctrine, 79
12.

YALE

L.J. 762, 764 (1970).

[hereinafter cited as 79

YALE

L.J. 762]

Greatwater Resource, supra note 8, at 585.

13. 1 Clark, supra note 9, § 35.2 at 181. The charter prohibited the king from
placing weirs in tidal rivers, but not along the seashores.
14. 79 YALE L.J., 762, supra note 11, at 768.
15.

Greatwater Resource, supra note 8, at 591.

The trust doctrine, as it de-

velops over the centuries, is clearly related to pressing economic needs, and can be
formulated to accomplish many purposes. "Maximum benefits are not obtained from a
resource unless (1) conflicting claims are given priorities that accurately reflect their
relative importance and (2) provision is made for multiple use to the extent that
less pressing claims can be allowed without seriously damaging the higher priority
uses." 79 YALE L.J. supra note 11, at 762.
16.

GreatwaterResource, supra note 8, at 597.

17. U.S. CONSTTUTION art. I, § 8; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894); Martin
v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
18. Clark, supra note 9, § 36.4(A) at 197.
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New Jersey Supreme Court considered the Avon case. The opinion
indicates a consciousness of the possibilities of the public trust doctrine
as a tool for judicial activism to counter legislative or administrative inaction or misappropriation regarding public resources. 19
Arnold v. Mundy2" was the first important case to deal with the public trust doctrine in New Jersey. The court reviewed the establishment
of the colony under Charles II's grant to the Duke of York and the later
grant to the Proprietors. The court concluded that New Jersey, like
the other colonies, was established to set up a government, not a private venture. Thus, tidal lands were subject to the same public
right and governmental control as such lands in England.2 ' The
legislature could improve tidal lands, or license their use, but it
"cannot make a direct and absolute grant, divesting all the citizens
of their common right.. ."I' Thus, though the lands could be alienated, they would continue to be subject to the public trust rights of
access, even after a conveyance.
Twenty-five years later, the New Jersey high court drastically
changed its position on the legislature's power to alienate trust lands.
In Gough v. Bell" at issue was the right to filled tidal lands in the
Hudson River. The court considered whether a state could convey
title to the soil of navigable2 4 rivers and seashores. Overruling Arnold,
the court concluded that while the king was limited in his power regarding trust lands, Parliament was not:
The objection to an alienation of the public domain by the king is,
that he is but a trustee for the community. But the legislature are
not mere trustees of common rights for the people. . . . The act
of the legislature is the act of the people ....25
The New Jersey legislature then, like Parliament, was free to grant public trust lands, including the seashore, to private parties, and thus to deprive the public of access to such lands permanently, subject only to the
federal control of navigation.
19. "New Jersey's experience-at once unique and typical-has involved probably the full range of legal, political, economic and social problems which can raise,
or develop around these [public trust] issues. Her tidal and navigable resources and
her citizenry's water interests have suffered perhaps more injury than those of any
other jurisdiction in the common law world." Greatwater Resource, supra note 8, at

649.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

6 N.J.L. 1 (Sup. Ct., 1821).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
21 N.J.L. 156 (Sup. Ct., 1847), after new trial, 22 N.J.L. 441 (Sup. Ct., 1850).
"Navigable" is construed in New Jersey in the common law sense of tidal wa-

ters rather than the more generally held American view that navigability in fact constitutes the test. Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369 (Sup. Ct., 1867), motion to
strike additionalplea granted,33 N.J.L. 223 (Sup. Ct., 1867).
25. Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 457-58 (Sup. Ct. 1850).
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In Avon, the court quoted extensively from Illinois Central Railroad
v. Illinois26 seemingly in an attempt to refound New Jersey law on this
watershed decision. Illinois Central, perhaps the most decisive case in
the public trust area, involved a grant by the Illinois legislature to the
Illinois Central Railroad of the submerged lands under the entire Chicago harbor. The fundamental question considered in Illinois Central
was the power of the legislature to alienate public lands,2 7 and the
measure of control retained by the state which would limit a grantee in
his use of the lands and preserve public rights of access to the resource.
The view of the public trust taken in Illinois Central, that the state may
act in its trustee role only to improve the public right, is the position en28
dorsed by the Avon court.
It is not, however, the position taken by the New Jersey courts prior
to Avon. Even in post-Illinois Central cases, 2 9 the courts operated on
26.

Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).

27. Id. at 451. The case makes it very clear that the Court will look skeptically
on any conduct which reallocates a resource or subjects public trust land to use by a
private interest. It has also been noted that the Court could have treated the
grant as a license to use the submerged lands under the harbor, which then could
have been revocable at the will of the legislature. Instead, as indicated, the Court stated
the issue in terms of the legislature's competency to grant such lands. Greatwater
Resource, supra note 8, at 623-24.
28. It is a title held in trust for the people of the State, that they may enjoy
the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty
of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties.
The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce
over them may be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves,
docks and piers therein, for which purpose the State may grant parcels of the
submerged lands; and, so long as their disposition is made for such purpose,
no valid objections can be made to the grants. It is grants of parcels of
lands under navigable waters that may afford foundation for wharves, piers,
docks, and other structures in aid of commerce, and grants of parcels
which, being occupied, do not substantially impair the public interest in the
lands and waters remaining, that are chiefly considered and sustained in the
adjudged cases as a valid exercise of legislative power consistently with
the trust to the public upon which such lands are held by the State. But
that is a very different doctrine from the one which would sanction the abdication of the general control of the State over lands under the navigable
waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake. Such abdication is
not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the government
of the State to preserve such waters for the use of the public. The trust
devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be discharged
by the management and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control of
the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such
parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can
be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in
the lands and waters remaining.
146 U.S. at 452-53.
29. Ross v. Mayor of Edgewater, 115 N.J.L. 477, 180 A. 866 (Sup. Ct., 1935),
affd per curiam, 116 N.J.L. 447, 184 A. 810 (Ct. Err. & App., 1936), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 543 (1936); Bailey v. Driscoll, 19 N.J. 363, 117 A.2d 265 (1955); Schultz v.
Wilson, 44 N.J. Super. 591, 131 A.2d 415 (App. Div., 1957), certif. denied, 24 N.J.
546, 133 A.2d 395 (1957).
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the assumption, articulated most recently in State v. Maas and Waldstein Co. 0 that:
Ownership of the land below the high water mark is vested in the
State and is held under the guardianship of the Legislature, which
is possessed of the same absolute power as Parliament enjoyed under the common law, to regulate, abridge or vacate public rights in
navigable rivers, except
in the field reserved to Congress by the
31
Federal Constitution.
However, the legislature's power to convey was not directly at issue
in Avon. The municipality is a creature of the state in administering
its beach park area, and the state's title to the foreshores is not disputed.
The court's view of the state's powers and the rights of the citizens is
important to the court's holding that the municipality must not deny
equal access to the beach area to any citizen. While the lower court
considered the common law rights of the citizens as vacated by the
legislature's enactment of N.J.S.A. 40:61-20.22, the supreme court decided that the state could not vacate the right of access to trust lands
in delegating its own authority to the municipality, which was in fact
acting in the state's own trustee role. 2
TOWARD A MODERN PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

Originally, the public trust doctrine, which developed as a response
to political and economic changes, was restricted to fishing and navigation uses."3 However, as leisure time has increased for the majority
of the population, the trust doctrine has expanded to include noneconomic public uses.3 4
30. 83 N.J. Super. 211, 199 A.2d 248 (1964).
31. Id. at 220, 199 A.2d at 252.
32. Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 309-10, 294 A.2d 47, 53-54
(1972).
33. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Sax].
34. The flexibility of the doctrine is explained as follows:
The principle that the public has an interest in tidelands and banks of navigable waters and a right to use them for purposes for which there is a substantial public demand may be derived from the fact that the public won a
right to passage over the shore for access to the sea for fishing when this
was the area of substantial public demand. As time goes by, opportunities
for much more extensive uses of these lands become available to the public.
The assertion by the public of a right to enjoy additional uses is met by the
assertion that the public right is defined and limited by precedent based
upon past uses and past demand. But such a limitation confuses the application of the principle under given circumstances with principle itself.
The law regarding the public use of property held in part for the benefit of the
public must change as the public need changes. The words of Justice Cardozo, expressed in a different context nearly a half-century ago, are relevant today in our
application of this law: "We may not suffer it to petrify at the cost of its animating
principle." 1 Clark supra note 9, § 36.4(B) at 202.
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The public trust has no life of its own and no intrinsic content. It
is no more-and no less-than a name Courts give35to their concerns
about the insufficiencies of the democratic process.
Thus, in recent years, many jurisdictions have recognized a public
right to access to water resources for other than commercial use. Scenic enjoyment has been included,3 6 as has recreation, as a protected public use.3 7 In Avon, the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged a
recreation easement in public lands, and interpreted the concept of public access to mean equality of access to all members of the public.
To date, Illinois courts have not considered the question of a recreation easement in or equality of access to public water resources. However, recent cases indicate that the courts might adopt a modem and
progressive view if the issue were presented. The Illinois Supreme
Court recognized the individual citizen's right to sue to preserve the
public trust in Paepcke v. Public Building Commission.8" Plaintiffs
challenged the authority of the Chicago Board of Education and other
agencies to construct schools and recreation facilities in two city parks.
The court specifically overruled, in part, an earlier decision, Droste v.
Kerner 9 which held that individuals did not have standing to sue to
enjoin a legislative grant of submerged lands to United States Steel.
In Paepcke, the plaintiffs asserted that the agencies had exceeded
their authority in appropriating park lands, and that the legislature
would have to specifically authorize the reallocation of park lands.
The court found the authorization sufficient to support the agencies'
action, and alluded to the approaches taken by two states, Massachusetts and Wisconsin, in solving reallocation of resource problems,40 as
valid tools for judicial action.
The Massachusetts courts have demanded that the decisions regarding public trust resources be made with maximum public visability
and participation. 41 In Gould v. Greylock Reservation Commission,42
where a writ of mandamus and declaratory relief were sought to pre35.

Sax, supra note 33, at 521.

36. Scenic Hudson Preservation Council v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d
608 (2nd Cir., 1965); Muench v. Public Service Commission, 261 Wis. 492, 53
N.W.2d 514, alf'd on rehearing, 261 Wis. 492, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952); City of Madison
v. State, 1 Wis. 2d 252, 83 N.W.2d 674 (1957).
37. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal.3d 29, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 465 P.2d 50
(1970); Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc.2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau Cty. 1972); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
38. 46 Ill.2d 330, 263 N.E.2d 11 (1970).
39. 34 Ill.2d 495, 217 N.E.2d 73 (1966).
40. 46 Ill.2d 330, 341, 343, 263 N.E.2d 11, 19 (1970).
41. Sax, supra note 33, at 502.
42. 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
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vent the lease of public lands for construction of ski resort facilities, a
presumption which guides public trust decisions was established.4" The
court held that in the absence of a definite and specific statement from
the legislature permitting such use, the Authority was exceeding its
power in executing the lease for a ski area. 44 The courts have thus
provided a mode of reviewing the actions of the administrative agencies which make most of the public resource decisions without directly
invalidating a legislative act.4 5 Other Massachusetts decisions indicate
the same concern for express authorization for change in use of public
lands. In Sacco v. Department of Public Works,46 the court notes that
there is a presumption in favor of environmental protection, which will
operate in public trust cases.
In Wisconsin, more than in any other state, the courts have attempted
to work out a rational and flexible meaning for the public trust doctrine.47 The Wisconsin approach considers the state's trusteeship role
as susceptible to more direct judicial intervention, and explicitly outlaws all state grants of water resources to private interests which do
not further public interests of the state and national citizenry.48
In State v. Public Service Commission49 the court articulated the cri43. Id. at 419, 215 N.E.2d at 123.
44. This recreational scheme, in the profits of which Resort is to share, is to
compete with private recreational ventures of similar character. The profit
sharing feature and some aspects of the project itself strongly suggest a commercial enterprise.
In addition to the absence of any clear or express
statutory authorization of as broad a delegation of responsibility by the
Authority as is given by the management agreement, we find no express
grant to the Authority of power to permit use of public lands and of the
Authority's borrowed funds for what seems, in part at least, a commercial
venture for private profit. If the enabling acts have not authorized such an
arrangement, the contention that an equity participation by the underwriter
and construction company is necessary in order to obtain revenue bond
financing cannot provide a justification for the agreement. The Authority, of
course, can seek further legislative authorization within proper constitutional
limits.
Id. at 426, 215 N.E.2d at 126.
45. Sax, supra note 33, at 498.
46. 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478 (1967).
47. Sax, supra note 33, at 509.
48. While the court early noted that the "trust reposed in the state is not a passive
trust; it is governmental, active and administrative . . . [and] requires the lawmaking
body to act in all cases where action is necessary, not only to preserve the trust, but
to promote it." City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 449, 214 N.W. 820, 830
(1927).
More recent decisions indicate that the court will closely consider the actual
promotion of public interests in plans or leases of the public trust. Hixon v. Public
Service Commission, 32 Wis.2d 608, 146 N.W.2d 577 (1966); Town of Ashwaubenon
v. Public Service Commission, 22 Wis.2d 38, 125 N.W.2d 647, 126 N.W.2d 567
(1963); City of Madison v. Tolzmann, 7 Wis.2d 570, 97 N.W.2d 513 (1959); City of
Madison v. State, 1 Wis.2d 252, 83 N.W.2d 674 (1957); Muench v. Public Service
Commission, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, aff'd on rehearing, 261 Wis. 492, 55
N.W.2d 40 (1952).
49. 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1957).
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teria it employed in implementing the public trust doctrine in a case
concerning a land fill project in an inland lake:
1) Public bodies will control use of area.
2) The area will be devoted to public purposes and open to the
public.
3) The diminution of lake area will be very small when compared
with the whole of Lake Wingra.
4) No one of the public uses of the lake as a lake will be destroyed or greatly impaired.
5) The disappointment of those members of the public who may
desire to boat, fish or swim in the area to be filled is negligible
when compared to the greater convenience to be afforded those
members of the public who use the city park.50
The flexibility of the public trust doctrine, is then being recognized
as an effective instrument in protecting and promoting public uses of
natural resources. The prospect for a progressive approach on trust
issues in Illinois seems particularly bright since the Paepcke case, where
the court indicated a willingness to construe the public right in broad
terms. Other jurisdictions such as Massachusetts and Wisconsin have
proposed guidelines for resolving the conflict of interests inherent in public trust disputes. The Avon case, however, introduces a new element
into the doctrine: equality of access to public lands.
MARY JOANN WOODS

50.

Id. at 118, 81 N.W.2d at 73.

